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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the use of history in legal interpretation
through an empirical analysis of one of the most prominent examples of
historical evidence in law: citations to The Federalist in Supreme Court
Justices' published opinions.' In particular, the Article examines a phe-
nomenon that has occurred frequently over the last two decades, but has
thus far been virtually ignored: the citation by different Justices to the
same historical source (such as The Federalist) to support divergent or
opposing historical interpretations of legal meaning. Although the use of
historical evidence in constitutional interpretation is itself much debated,
The Federalist continues to be cited as binding or persuasive authority by
scholars and judges.2 While reliance on history has often been associated
with conservative or originalist jurisprudential theories,3 historical
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State, B.A., Notre Dame. This research was presented previously at the annual meetings of the
Southwestern Social Science Association, the Georgia Political Science Association, and the South-
em Political Science Association. I am grateful to Thomas P. Dolan, John Goldberg, Nancy
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1. The collection of essays known as The Federalist is also commonly referred to as "The
Federalist Papers." See, e.g., Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers:
Is there Less Here than Meets the Eye?, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 243, 243 (2005); Shlomo
Slonim, The Federalist Papers and the Bill ofRights, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 151, 151 (2003); Seth
Barrett Tillman, The Federalist Papers as Reliable Source Materialfor Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 601,601 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2780, 2822-23, 2830 (2006) (citing Feder-
alist Nos. 28, 47, and 70).
3. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Interpreting the Constitution (1985), reprinted in JACK N.
RAKOVE ED., INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 13-21 (Jack N. Rakove Ed., 1990); William Bren-
nan, A Living Constitution, reprinted in RAKOVE ED., INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 23-34
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evidence has increasingly been used to support legal arguments from
across the political spectrum.4 This phenomenon among legal scholars
has received attention as it has arisen,5 but it has not yet been analyzed as
applied to the courts.
One might think that history is used predominantly by one side of a
given legal controversy while the other side grounds its argument in
other areas such as contemporary policy implications; this is especially
true given the common association made between the jurisprudential
theory of originalism and conservative or libertarian outcomes. But, in
fact, at times history is used by both sides in a given controversy to sup-
port opposing interpretations.
A particularly striking example of this phenomenon occurred in the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Printz v. United States.6 In his
majority opinion striking down statutory provisions requiring state offi-
cials to enforce the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, the
conservative Justice Scalia made numerous references to various essays
of The Federalist, presumably as evidence of the original understanding
of federalism and dual sovereignty at the time of the Constitution's rati-
fication.7 Justice Scalia, however, was not alone. In their dissenting
opinions, the more liberal Justices Stevens and Souter also made dozens
of references to that same source, The Federalist, to support their oppos-
ing views on the outcome of the case.8 When one reads the opinion, it
seems that the entire case, and each opinion expressed by the writing Jus-
tices, depends on different interpretations of the same historical source,
The Federalist. Indeed, Justice Souter explicitly stated that "it is The
Federalist that finally determines my position." 9 From Printz it would
appear that the appeal of history transcends ideological lines.
This Article examines the use of history as support for competing
arguments in the courts by studying the deployment of historical support
from The Federalist in opinions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court. It
demonstrates that in a significant number of cases where the majority
opinion cites The Federalist, a dissenting or concurring opinion also cites
The Federalist. These results provide support for the claim that history
(critiquing originalism as a hidebound conservative practice and offering instead a progressive the-
ory of a "living Constitution" adaptable to evolving societal imperatives).
4. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996) (examining the
"turn to history" among liberal legal scholars in the 1980s and 1990s, partly as a response to the
assertion of conservative originalism as an interpretive methodology reliant on history). Id. at 139-
43.
5. See id.
6. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
7. Id. at 910-24 (citing The Federalist).
8. Id. at 939-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 970-78 (Souter, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 971 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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can be-and, in fact, is-used to support different sides of many legal
arguments. While others have argued that such a situation undermines
the notion that The Federalist is a reliable source for historical under-
standings of the Constitution, 0 I suggest that the rise in citations to The
Federalist shows at a minimum the increasing importance and appeal of
historical authority as a source of legitimacy and persuasiveness in legal
argument today.
The Federalist may be the most frequently-cited historical source
used as evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution." It has
been particularly popular among Supreme Court Justices since the be-
ginning of the Rehnquist Court in 1986.12 The Federalist is used fre-
quently to support arguments regarding the political theory, meaning, or
intent of the Framers specifically, or of the founding generation more
generally. 13 Previous empirical studies have indicated a substantial in-
crease in frequency of citations to The Federalist by the Supreme Court
in the last two decades. 14 In this Article, I hypothesize that because of
the legitimizing effect of history and the indeterminacy of evidence from
The Federalist, a substantial percentage of Supreme Court decisions cit-
ing The Federalist will be accompanied by a dissenting opinion also cit-
ing The Federalist.
I test this hypothesis by examining all the Rehnquist Court deci-
sions citing The Federalist and comparing the number that also have ad-
ditional opinions, including dissents, citing to The Federalist.5 The
analysis demonstrates that while the absolute number of cases with mul-
tiple opinions citing The Federalist may seem modest at first glance,
10. See Durschlag, supra note 1; Tillman, supra note 1.
11. Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard, & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court and Opinion
Content: The Use ofThe Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329, 330 (2005) ("Arguably the Federal-
ist Papers are the most cited and most important source of original authority."); see also id at tbl. I
(showing that from 1953-1984 citations to The Federalist comprised over one-third of all Supreme
Court citations to historical sources purporting to show evidence of original meaning, far outpacing
in frequency all other sources cited).
12. See Durchslag, supra note 1, at 295 (finding a substantial increase in frequency of citations
to The Federalist during the Rehnquist Court years (through 2002) as compared to previous periods).
13. See Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611,612-13 (1999).
14. Corley et al., supra note 11, at 332; Ira C. Lupu, Time, the Supreme Court, and The Feder-
alist, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1324, 1330 (1998) ("[T]he most recent two decades have been posi-
tively riotous with citations to The Federalist .... ); Buckner F. Melton, Jr., The Supreme Court
and The Federalist: A Citation List and Analysis, 1789-1996, 85 Ky. L.J. 243 (1997); see Durschlag,
supra note I (arguing that The Federalist has been less central to the reasoning and the holding of
Supreme Court opinions where the essays are cited, but nonetheless acknowledging that citations to
The Federalist have increased dramatically over the past several decades).
15. Infra Part IV. Only one other academic study of which the author is aware has addressed
the question of comparing citations to The Federalist in multiple opinions in the same case. See
Corley et al., supra note 11, at 335 (political science study hypothesizing, inter alia, a "dueling cita-
tions" pattern in cases with multiple citations to The Federalist).
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such cases in fact comprise over eighteen percent of the total number of
cases citing The Federalist Multiple opinions occur most often in high-
profile cases dealing with structural constitutional questions, such as
separation of powers and federalism.1 6 The Justices continue to fre-
quently deploy the writings of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay's pseudony-
mous author Publius as a source of historical support, and the frequency
with which opposing sides in the same case cite this same source of his-
torical evidence is significant.
In Part II of this Article, I first examine the background controversy
over the use of history in law, focusing particularly on The Federalist as
perhaps the most significant historical source cited in modem legal ar-
gument for the purpose of illuminating the original meaning of the Con-
stitution to the framing generation. Part III provides a survey of prior
empirical literature examining the citation of The Federalist in U.S. Su-
preme Court opinions. Part VI explains the Article's empirical research
design and methodology for studying the question of how often The Fed-
eralist is cited both in majority and separate opinions, while Part V pro-
vides the results of the research. In Part VI, I will briefly discuss these
results and the questions that remain for future research, before conclud-
ing with Part V.
These results are noteworthy in light of the continuing debate over
the use of history in law. They suggest two conclusions: first, that the
use of history to support legal arguments is not a tactic of any one side or
ideology but is increasingly popular among jurists and legal scholars of
varied jurisprudential persuasions; and second, that in addition to study-
ing the normative question of whether history should be used in the law,
perhaps it would be helpful to examine how history and law interact from
a methodological perspective.
II. THE FEDERALIST AND HISTORY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. The Federalist as Historical Evidence from the Founding Era
The delegates to the Convention in Philadelphia produced their
draft Constitution for the United States government in September 1787.17
The Convention itself followed a period of much debate over what form
of government the new nation should have and what type of charter
could best effectuate such a government. 18 Since the formal end of the
Revolutionary War in 1783, the Articles of Confederation that had
16. Infra Part VI; see also Durschlag, supra note 1, at 296.
17. EDWARD J. LARSON & MICHAEL P. WINSHIP, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: A
NARRATIVE HISTORY FROM THE NOTES OF JAMES MADISON 152-56 (2005).
18. Id. at 5-10.
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served as the authority for the Continental Congress since 1775 had in-
creasingly come to be acknowledged as too weak and inefficient to give
the national government sufficient power.' 9 Many Americans are famil-
iar with the story of how the delegates of the thirteen states met in Phila-
delphia; engaged in fascinating, high-level debates about law and the
nature of government; made a series of compromises about representa-
tion, sectional interests, and other issues; and produced a Constitution
that was ratified and still stands today as the oldest written Constitution
in the world.2°
What is easier to forget, given its subsequent history, is that the rati-
21fication of the Constitution by the states was by no means a sure thing.
The opponents of ratification, known to history as the "anti-federalists,
22
had numerous objections, ranging from the legal authority (or lack
thereof) of the Convention in the first place, to its compromises between
sectional interests, to its transfer of some power and sovereignty from the
states to the national government.23 Opposition was not confined to any
particular region or to the larger or smaller states; in several states such
as Rhode Island, Virginia, and New York, the issue was in serious
doubt.24
The Constitution's supporters saw New York's ratification as criti-
cal to the success of the Constitution, and indeed to the whole American
project. 25 As one of the largest states, with an emerging power in trade
and economy, and because of its central geographic position, many be-
19. Id. at 5-6.
20. Id; Steven G. Calabresi, "A Shining City on a Hill": American Exceptionalism and the
Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1335, 1391 (noting
that the U.S. has the world's oldest written national constitution).
21. Dan T. Coenen, A Rhetoric for Ratification: The Argument of The Federalist and its Impact
on Constitutional Interpretation, 56 DUKE L.J. 469, 486 (2006) ("A modem observer might well
suppose that ratification of the Constitution was a sure bet under the difficult conditions of late
1787.").
22. See generally JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, 1781-1788 (1961) (providing the history of the Antifederalists); see also SAUL
CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM & THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA,
1788-1828 (1999) (linking Anti-federalism with a broader tradition of dissent in the early republic
era); RALPH KETCHAM ED., THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION DEBATES (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (collecting Anti-federalist essays from the period
of the ratification debates).
23. LARSON & WINSHIP, supra note 17, at 157-58; CORNELL, supra note 22, at 61-8 (opposi-
tion to federal consolidation).
24. Id.; CORNELL, supra note 22, at 23 (map showing voting patterns on ratification within the
states). In Virginia, for example, even the weight of political luminaries such as James Madison (the
"father of the Constitution") and George Washington (the president of the Philadelphia convention)
was countered by the prominence and the arguments of anti-federalists such as George Mason, Rich-
ard Henry Lee, and Patrick Henry. Id. at 53.
25. LARSON & WINSHIP, supra note 17, at 158.
2007]
Seattle University Law Review
lieved that New York's participation was crucial to the national govern-
ment's success, including James Madison and Alexander Hamilton.26
But there was substantial opposition to the Constitution within New
York, led by the state's governor, the powerful and influential George
Clinton.27 Indeed, halfway through the Philadelphia Convention itself,
two out of New York's three delegates left, believing the Convention
lacked proper authority to draft a new charter of government. 28 Alexan-
der Hamilton remained in Philadelphia to participate but was unable to
vote without a quorum from his state.29
Hamilton took it upon himself in the fall of 1787 to make the case
for the Constitution in the New York newspapers.30 Engaging first John
Jay, a leading lawyer and politician, and then James Madison, one of the
architects of the Constitution then serving in Congress in New York,
Hamilton's project produced a series of eighty-five essays addressed to
the people of New York urging ratification of the document.3' These
essays appeared in the New York media over a period from October
1787 through the following spring.32 The three authors wrote under the
nom de guerre "Publius," adopting the custom of the day of using classi-
cal-sounding pseudonyms (in part to invoke the tradition of Roman re-
publicanism). 33 These essays were soon republished as a collection and
have long been known to history as The Federalist.34
Since the Constitution's ratification in 1789, The Federalist has
been one of the most famous and most cited sources of historical
information from the founding era.35 Among scholars, politicians, and
the American public at large, references to The Federalist have long been
used to explain the meaning of the Constitution or American political
theory.36 Citations to The Federalist reflect several different purposes,
from an originalist attempt to invoke historical authority for interpreting
26. Id.; Coenen, supra note 21, at 475-76.
27. CORNELL, supra note 22, at 82, 84.
28. Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original
Meaning of the United States Constitution, 78 B.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-969675.
29. Id.
30. Coenen, supra note 2 1, at 477.
31. Id. at 480 (noting that 77 essays were printed in the New York papers and eight more were
included in the book version that was printed in 1788).
32. Id. at 479-80.
33. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Federalist and the Lessons of Rome, 75 Miss. L.J. 431, 434 (2006)
(noting that the Publius pseudonym was a reference to the Roman Publuis Valerius, also known as
"Publicola," meaning "lover of the people.").
34. LARSON & WINSHIP, supra note 17, at 158.
35. Coenen, supra note 21, at 471; Maggs, supra note 28, at 2-3.
36. Coenen, supra note 21, at 471.
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the Constitution to a more generalized appeal to the republican constitu-
tional theory laid out in the substance of the essays. 37
The actual influence of Publius's essays on the ratification debate in
New York has long been assumed, but more recently questioned;38 at a
minimum, however, it is fair to say that The Federalist is perhaps the
best source for encapsulating and communicating many of the most theo-
retical and philosophical arguments for the Constitution. As such, it has
proved to be perhaps the most significant source of historical evidence to
which Americans look when seeking to understand and explain the Con-
stitution. 39  For the purposes of this Article, therefore, The Federalist
fulfills the role of a measurable indicator of a popular source of contem-
poraneous historical information about the Constitution that the Justices
of the Supreme Court may consult.
B. Using History (and The Federalist) to Interpret the Constitution
The appeal to history as authority for constitutional interpretation is
commonly associated with contemporary advocates of originalism be-
cause of its controversial prominence in the policy of the Reagan admini-
stration,40 and its place in the jurisprudence of currently sitting Justices
Scalia and Thomas.4' It may also be thought that there is a natural affin-
ity, in the philosophical or temperamental sense, between respect for his-
tory and conservatism. 42 Melvyn Durchslag makes this assumption in his
trenchant analysis of The Federalist, noting at several points that one
would "expect" the more conservative Justices to cite The Federalist as
historical evidence.43 However, a critical view of the Supreme Court's
use of history is not new, nor have the subjects always been conservative
Justices; historian Alfred Kelly's influential 1965 article Clio and the
37. Id.
38. See generally Kramer, supra note 13.
39. Id; see also Corley et al., supra note 11, at 330.
40. See generally Meese, supra note 3, at 13-2 1; see also RAKOVE, supra note 3 (noting that
Meese's essay became a touchstone of the conservative call for a jurisprudence of original inten-
tion); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION, 377-85 (1988)
(critiquing the calls for "a jurisprudence of original intention" by Edwin Meese, Robert Bork, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist).
41. See ANTONIN M. SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997); see also, e.g., Gene R.
Nichol, Justice Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials of an Occasional Originalist, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 953, 956 (1999) ("Scalia, as is well known, is also the nation's leading 'originalist."').
42. See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006); Ernest Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C.
L. REV. 619, 623 (1993) (arguing that modem originalism is not in fact true to the classical conserva-
tive respect for tradition).
43. Durschlag, supra note 1, at 298; see also Corley et al., supra note 11, at 333 (finding
among Supreme Court Justices a correlation between conservative ideology and frequency of cita-
tion to The Federalist).
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Court: An Illicit Love Affair accused the liberal Warren Court of practic-
ing "law office history" in a strikingly similar tone to that heard from
modem critics of the originalists on the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. 44
Likewise, in the legal academy, scholars of all political stripes frequently
appeal to history to bolster the legitimacy of their arguments. 45 The turn
to history has been especially pronounced in legal scholarship, as liberal
legal scholars have offered their own historical arguments for under-
standing the law.46 Legal scholars who write in this vein often focus (as
did the conservative proponents of originalism in the 1980s) on interpre-
tive accounts of the founding era and contemporary sources in order to
reconstruct the original meaning or understanding of constitutional law.47
The inquiry I conduct in this Article proceeds from the observation that
no single constitutional theory, or political persuasion, owns a monopoly
on the use of history-nearly everyone seems to be using history these
days.48
But since the prevailing critique of originalism as an interpretive
methodology has been the use of history by judges in deciding cases, we
should inquire as to whether this academic trend toward using history to
support both conservative and liberal arguments also exists in the judici-
ary. Despite several studies analyzing the use of leading historical
44. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119. For an
updated evaluation of the Kelly thesis, see Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of
the Supreme Court's Uses of History, 13 J. L. & POL. 809 (1997).
45. See generally KALMAN, supra note 4 (examining the "turn to history" in legal scholarship).
Kalman's primary example of liberal academics attempting to capture historical arguments is in the
"republican revival" of the 1980s, where law professors seized on the historiography of Bernard
Baylin, Gordon Wood, and J.G.A. Pocock to assert that the Constitution was intended to enshrine
republican values of civic virtue and the public good. KALMAN, supra note 4, at 143-60.
46. See KALMAN, supra note 4, at 140-43. Since Kalman published her definitive account of
the turn to history in the legal academy, leading scholars have continued to publish historically-
based legal analyses, especially in the field of constitutional theory. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER,
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005).
47. While liberal legal scholars and proponents of originalism as an interpretive methodology
both use historical sources, there are key differences between these schools, with perhaps the most
important being the distinction between looking to the original intent of the Framers, as originalists
such as Meese have advocated, and seeking a broader picture of the original meaning of the Consti-
tution to the members of the ratifying generation. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996). However, this distinction is no
longer as salient as it once was, as many leading proponents of originalism have stressed that they
also focus on original public meaning rather than intent. See SCALIA, supra note 41; RANDY E.
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89 (2004) ("The
version of originalism I shall defend will be based on 'original meaning' as distinct from 'original
intent."').
48. Or, as Larry Kramer intoned, "[W]e are all originalists, we are all non-originalists."
Kramer, supra note 13, at 677.
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sources such as The Federalist,49 there is on the whole a dearth of schol-
arship investigating the extent to which judges cite historical evidence in
their judicial opinions. ° To continue the analogy to legal scholarship,
where it has been noted that scholars now frequently engage in legal de-
bates that use history on both sides, we should ask whether this same
phenomenon also occurs on the bench.
One way to investigate whether this phenomenon occurs is to ex-
amine judicial opinions from multi-judge panels, and determine whether
judges who disagree on the outcome or the reasoning nonetheless both
make competing historical claims. How then, for example, might Jus-
tices on the U.S. Supreme Court, the highest court charged with constitu-
tional interpretation, deploy historical evidence against each other when
they disagree in their interpretations? My research question asks how
often Justices invoke historical evidence in multiple opinions within the
same decision.
To operationalize this inquiry, I examine The Federalist. It is by no
means the only source of historical evidence that Justices use when in-
terpreting the Constitution, but it is likely the single historical source
most often cited in Court opinions. 5' Perhaps the Justices so frequently
refer to The Federalist for the same reasons I choose it as an indicator: it
is well known, easily accessible, and, as the most famous group of essays
expounding the Constitution during the ratification period, often thought
to hold an exalted status in understanding constitutional meaning, serving
as "a kind of secular scripture. ' 52 Indeed, the very fact that the Court has
so frequently cited it in the past has contributed further to the status of
The Federalist as influential historical evidence.53 The authority and
tradition associated with The Federalist in turn lends it an even greater
aura of legitimacy for the Justices' purposes, and hence, greater incentive
49. Durschlag, supra note 1; Melton, supra note 14; Lupu, supra note 14.
50. For example, there is a much higher frequency of studies that analyze the normative issues
surrounding the courts' use of history than the empirical issue of to what extent courts actually in
fact do rely on historical sources. See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical
Analysis of the Court's Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217 (2004) (reviewing the
"vast body of primary historical materials ... that support a spectrum of constitutional meaning" and
the accordingly futile project of constraining judicial interpretation with originalist principles). Id. at
287.
51. Maggs, supra note 28, at 2 ("In the aggregate, academic writers and jurists have cited the
Federalist Papers as evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution more than any other his-
torical source except the text of the Constitution itself .... The Supreme Court takes the essays
especially seriously.").
52. Daniel W. Howe, The Political Psychology ofThe Federalist, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 485, 485
(1987); see also Kramer, supra note 13, at 611.
53. Lupu, supra note 14, at 1328-30; Melton, supra note 1410, at 251-54.
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to cite to the papers' pseudonymous author, Publius.54 Therefore, this
study will use The Federalist as a measurable, if rough, indicator for ap-
peal to historical arguments in Supreme Court opinions.
There are several theoretical bases that could explain the Justices'
use of The Federalist. The most controversial basis involves explicit or
implicit reliance on the texts as an authoritative source of original intent
or meaning.55 Beyond their usefulness for originalist interpretation per
se, the texts' popularity is also grounded in the substance of the essays.
There is a long tradition, perhaps dating back to the early national period,
of prominent jurists such as Chancellor Kent and Justice Story utilizing
The Federalist not so much as an authoritative explanation of the fram-
ers' specific intent regarding particular constitutional provisions, but
more as a learned commentary on the general meaning of the Constitu-
tion.56 It is in this vein, Melvyn Durchslag contends, that The Federalist
was primarily used by courts in the nineteenth century: Professor Dur-
chslag shows that the Supreme Court tended to cite generally to The
Federalist without reference to either specific numbered papers or to
specific constitutional provisions. 57
Modem authors have analyzed The Federalist in this generalized
approach as well, exploring the philosophical underpinnings of Madi-
son's and Hamilton's essays or examining the relation of the essays to
American political theory.58 Garry Wills argues that the essays reflect
the influence of Hume and other figures of the Scottish Enlightenment.59
Larry Kramer's article Madison's Audience suggests in part that The
Federalist has proved more important in retrospect, serving as "the ur-
text of American political theory" more than the essays did at the time of
the ratification controversy that they were supposed to influence. 60 Most
recently, Dan Coenen suggests that The Federalist is useful as an inter-
54. See Kramer, supra note 13; Lupu, supra note 14; see also Corley et al., supra note 11, at
329 (arguing that "references to the Federalist Papers in the crafting of the opinions provide a veneer
of authority that can insulate the Court, and the justice, from criticism and controversy.").
55. Durschlag, supra note 1.
56. See Durschlag, supra note 1, at 255, 269 (citing the Commentaries of Chancellor James
Kent and Joseph Story).
57. Durschlag, supra note 1, at 256.
58. Durschlag, supra note 1, at 256; David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander
Hamilton, The Federalist, and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755, 755 (2001) (The Federalist
as "learned commentary"); MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1987) (evaluating the political philosophy of The Federalist); GARRY WILLS,
EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981).
59. WILLS, supra note 58, at 16.
60. Kramer, supra note 13, at 611.
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pretive aid because of its quality as a coherent argument for ratification
of the Constitution.61
It is when judges and scholars cite to The Federalist as a form of
originalist reliance on historical authority that has drawn the most atten-
tion in recent years. Originalism has been one of the most controversial
topics in constitutional law and politics over the past generation. It en-
tered the public discourse when Reagan Administration Attorney General
Edwin Meese called for a "return" to "a jurisprudence of original inten-
tion, ' 62 and debates over originalist theory played a prominent role in the
nomination and defeat of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork.63 For
these reasons, originalism has generally been associated over the last two
decades with conservative politics. Indeed, Republican politicians con-
tinue to advocate the nomination of judges who would profess to be
faithful to the Constitution as written by the framers.64
However, in recent years originalism has made something of a
comeback as a matter of debate in the legal academy. During the late
1980s and especially the 1990s, many liberal law professors also began
to "turn to history" to offer alternative explanations of constitutional
meaning that were nonetheless grounded in historical evidence and au-
thority.65 Even more recently, scholars have offered new analyses of
originalism that go beyond the "original intent" versus "living constitu-
tion" framework that characterized the debates of the 1980S. 6 6 Yet the
longstanding association of originalist jurisprudence with political con-
servatism lingers, which is perhaps in part why Professor Durchslag
would "expect" The Federalist to be more often cited by conservative
Justices such as Chief Justice Rehnquist.67 It is this commonly held as-
61. Coenen, supra note 21, at 470 (arguing that the collection of essays taken as a whole forms
a structured, rational, and comprehensive argument for ratification).
62. Edwin Meese, Interpreting the Constitution: A Jurisprudence of Original Intent (1986),
reprinted in JACK N. RAKOVE ED., INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 19.
63. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 271-93 (1990).
64. See, e.g., Bob Lewis, Giuliani Praises Conservative Judges, ABC NEWS, Feb. 17, 2007,
http://www.abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=2882966.
65. See generally KALMAN, supra note 4 (chronicling the "turn to history" by liberal law pro-
fessors); G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV.
485, 487-93 (2002).
66. See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted" Originalism, 75
U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006); John 0. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretative Princi-
ples as the Core of Originalism, (San Diego Legal Stud. Paper No. 07-82, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=962142; McGinnis & Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101
NW U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 68 (2007); William Michael Treanor, Original Understanding and the
Whether, Why, and How of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 218 (2007); Balkin, Jack
M., "Abortion and Original Meaning" (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 119, 2006),
available at: http://ssm.com/abstract=925558.
67. Durschlag, supra note 1, at 289.
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sumption that prompts this Article's inquiry into which Justices ("con-
servative" or "liberal") on the Rehnquist Court cited The Federalist, and
whether Justices from both sides might be citing The Federalist to reach
opposing conclusions in the same cases.
Even if one assumes that reliance on The Federalist might derive
from one's favoring originalism as an interpretive approach, there are
several different approaches to originalism that prevail today. As consti-
tutional historian Jack Rakove has elucidated, the relation between his-
tory and interpretation depends on whether one is alluding to original
intent, original meaning, or original understanding.68 The first variant of
originalism, and one that is correctly associated with originalism, is the
theory that The Federalist definitively explains the Constitution's origi-
nal intent, in large part because of the status of Madison and Hamilton as
official Framers-that is, as participants in the drafting of the Constitu-
tion at the Convention in Philadelphia. 69 Another form of originalist use
of The Federalist is based on the supposition that the published essays
played an influential role in the actual ratification of the Constitution and
thus explain the original understanding of the ratifiers.70 Alternatively, it
can serve as evidence of the meaning of the text of the Constitution at the
time of its adoption. 71  "Original-meaning" originalism, in fact, is the
variant of originalism that leading proponents such as Randy Barnett ad-
vocate (as opposed to the reliance on original intent much caricatured in
the 1980s and 1990s).72 Whether serving as evidence of original intent,
original understanding, or original meaning, this range of purposes is
manifest in the fact that The Federalist is cited to some degree by all of
the current Justices.73
68. RAKOVE, supra note 47.
69. Madison and Hamilton both attended the Constitutional Convention, each making different
contributions: Madison is justly famous for his leading role in the debates and for his copious notes,
which since published have been adverted to as an authoritative source of original intent. See gener-
ally LARSON & WINSHIP, supra note 17. Hamilton served as the lone representative for New York.
See supra text at notes 27-28. Hamilton's participation later enabled him to lead the efforts for
ratification in New York-including the production of The Federalist essays. See Coenen, supra
note 21, at 476-79; LARSON & WINSHIP, supra note 17, at 158.
70. See, e.g., Kramer, Madison's Audience, supra note 13, at 611 (noting the use of Federalist
No. 10 in this manner); see also McGowan, supra note 58, at 756 (explaining the theory of the es-
says' influence on ratification as one of "reliance based contract theory").
71. McGowan, supra note 58, at 756-57. As noted, this is the theory that Justice Scalia uses in
defending his practice of consulting of The Federalist. See SCALIA, supra note 41, at 38 (explaining
that he looks to The Federalist "not because [Madison and Hamilton] were Framers and therefore
their intent is authoritative and must be the law; but rather because their writings, like those of other
intelligent and informed people of the time, display how the text of the Constitution was originally
understood.").
72. BARNETT, supra note 41, at 89-93.
73. For a discussion of the differences between the concepts of original intent, original mean-
ing, and original understanding, see RAKOVE, supra note 47, at 8-11.
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Criticism of using The Federalist in judicial constitutional exegesis
falls into two categories. The first is normative: that The Federalist is
not legitimate as a source of authority, either because Justices should not
use history generally, or because The Federalist in particular should not
be accorded any exalted status as a statement of original intent or mean-
ing. For example, Dean Kramer argues that, despite the insightfulness of
its authors and the quality of the essays, The Federalist in fact had a very
limited actual readership among the ratifying population, and it is thus
problematic to regard it as a source purportedly speaking to original un-
derstanding.74 H. Jefferson Powell has written that the authors them-
selves did not intend for The Federalist to be used as interpretive author-
ity.75 William Eskridge contends that it is fundamentally inconsistent for
the Justices to refuse to consider legislative history, as Justice Scalia fa-
mously does, while at the same time copiously citing The Federalist (as
Justice Scalia did in Printz), because the essays are themselves analogous
to a legislative history of the Constitution.76 Others have even attempted
to argue from a postmodernist perspective against using The Federalist
as an authoritative text.77 These arguments attempt to cast doubt on the
74. Kramer, supra note 13, at 613-14. Kramer argues in particular that because The Federalist
was not widely read, the ideas of James Madison, especially those articulated in Federalist No. 10
regarding the political theory of competing interests and factions in a republic, should not be ac-
corded the "commanding position" they occupy in constitutional debate; they were not, as is often
asserted, "decisive in shaping the Constitution." Id.
75. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885, 936 (1985) (Arguing that Madison himself "cautioned ... against an uncritical use of The Fed-
eralist, because it is fair to keep in mind that the authors might be sometimes influenced by the zeal
of advocates." (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (Apr. 17, 1824), reprinted
in LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (1865))).
76. LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (1865).
76. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but not Statutory
Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (1998). Justice Scalia is said to be fond of
quoting Harold Leventhal's line that "using legislative history is like looking over the heads of the
guests at a cocktail party until you spot your friends." David Franklin, Judge Dread: Antonin Scalia
Explains why we Should Fear Men in Robes, SLATE, Jan. 22, 1997, http://www.slate.com/id/2960.
In fact, it even can be argued that The Federalist papers are less authoritative than ordinary legisla-
tive history. Eskridge, supra, at 1309. Madison's famous notes from the Convention can be said to
be more like legislative history, while The Federalist can perhaps be better analogized to an advo-
cacy document such as a newspaper editorial. See Durchslag, supra note 1, at 312 ("The Federalist
Papers were advocacy, which today might resemble sophisticated 'op-ed' pieces or essays in the
magazines of the intelligentsia."); Coenen, supra note 21, at 472.
77. See J. Michael Martinez & William D. Richardson, The Federalist Papers and Legal Inter-
pretation, 45 S.D. L. REV. 307, 309 (2000) ("[W]e examine The Federalist Papers, primarily be-
cause this is a source that is afforded great weight in the American regime and because the essays
have been cited many times in legal cases. We hope to demonstrate that, despite the text's revered
place within the American political system, it cannot serve as a means of interpreting legal rules.
The Federalist Papers undoubtedly lends historic, and perhaps philosophical, context to many consti-
tutional provisions, but that is far different than serving as a precedent for applying specific rules in
the context of legal cases and controversies.").
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utility of The Federalist, and provide the background question informing
my inquiry.
But the bottom line is that both scholars and judges continue to in-
voke Publius to support or explain their legal reasoning. This leads to
the second line of criticism, which is a methodological one: that using
The Federalist is problematic, because the historical evidence that can be
gleaned from it is indeterminate. Given its nature as a piece of advocacy,
as well as its having multiple authors, scholars have questioned whether
The Federalist can even be said to embody a coherent political theory at
all. Evidence can be found in its pages to support arguments in direct
conflict with one another.78  Practitioners of "law office history" are
prone to the charge that they simply canvass the eighty-five essays to
find, and cite, snippets from these "Framers" to support their position of
advocacy, as quotations can be mined from the papers to support nearly
any position.79
Not surprisingly, the uses to which The Federalist is put-the sub-
stantive issues for which the papers are examined as historical evi-
dence-tend to be structural constitutional issues. Legal scholars have
invoked the authority of Publius, often in taking diametrically opposed
views, to explain the "correct" understanding of separation of powers,8°
the role of the judiciary,81 and the general political theory of the Consti-
78. But see Coenen, supra note 21 (arguing that the essays taken as a whole present a coherent
argument).
79. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 523, 554 (1995). This critique alludes to the very "cocktail party" complaint that Justice
Scalia so often asserts against the use of legislative history. See Franklin, supra note 76.
80. See Joseph M. Lynch, The Federalists and The Federalist: A Forgotten History, 31 SETON
HALL L. REV. 18, 19-24 (2000) (charging that Hamilton and the early Federalist party acted in direct
contradiction to the separation of powers theory set forth in Hamilton's Federalist papers); Victoria
Nourse, Toward a "Due Foundation "for the Separation of Powers: The Federalist Papers as Politi-
cal Narrative, 74 TEX. L. REV. 447, 449-50, 497-505 (1996) (arguing that a revisionist reading of
The Federalist provides a "narrative of power" more concerned with political relationships, as
opposed to the traditional reading emphasizing functional separation through "checks and balances,"
and noting that "[i]n the past decade, no major Supreme Court opinion or law review article on the
separation of powers has failed to enlist Madison or Madison's Federalist in the contemporary battle
....."); Price Marshall, "No Political Truth ": The Federalist and Justice Scalia on the Separation of
Powers, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 245, 248 (1990) (contending that Justice Scalia is "the right-
ful heir of the Publian approach to the separation of powers").
81. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Selection: A View From The
Federalist Papers, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1669 (1988) (arguing that the Supreme Court has fundamen-
tally misinterpreted the theory of The Federalist); Anita L. Allen, The Federalist's Plain Meaning:
Reply to Tushnet, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1701 (1988), (arguing that The Federalist embodies no singular
interpretive theory); Sotirios A. Barber, Judicial Review and The Federalist, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 836,
836 (1988) ("[T]he general theory of constitutional government in The Federalist favors judicial
activism.").
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tution. 82 The Federalist is cited both by politically conservative original-
ists and by politically liberal nonoriginalists and proponents of more pro-
gressive interpretive theories. 83 Others have argued that those who offer
rival understandings of The Federalist are getting it wrong by failing to
appreciate the larger historical context.84 It is this methodological line of
criticism that provides the point of departure for my inquiry: If evidence
from The Federalist is indeterminate, or can be used to support either
side of an argument, to what extent do Supreme Court Justices invoke its
authority on opposite sides of the same case?
III. PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE FEDERALIST
The large majority of scholarship on the Supreme Court and The
Federalist deals with the content of the essays, the theories they alleg-
edly embody, or the specific issues for which they are cited. Garry
Wills's study, for example, lends insight into the political philosophy that
animated the authors of the essays; 85 Dean Kramer's work illuminates
the extent (or lack) of actual influence that the papers had during the rati-
fication debates;86 Professor Coenen's work assesses the coherence and
consistency of the overall argument of The Federalist.87 Several authors
have noted the high frequency of Supreme Court citations to the Federal-
ist, however, and have conducted more empirical studies quantitatively
measuring how the Court actually uses The Federalist (this Article in-
82. See McGowan, supra note 58; Tushnet, supra note 81; see also ALAN BRINKLEY, NELSON
W. POLSBY, & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, THE NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS: ESSAYS IN DEFENSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1997) (attempting to replay the role of Publius in defending the Constitution
and its evolution from contemporary criticisms). The Federalist has been given great weight by
professional scholars in explaining the Framers' political philosophy at least since the Progressive
school of historians. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 152-188 (The Free Press 1986) (1913) (relying to a great
extent on The Federalist to explain his interpretation of the Framers' economic theory).
83. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539, 1558-59
(1988) (using Madison's Federalist No. 10 to reflect on Madison's version of republican theory);
Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493, 1509 (1988) (examining Federalist No. 78).
It is probably fair to generalize, however, that originalist scholars might be more likely to see The
Federalist as an authoritative textual source, while progressives or civic republicans may be more
likely to examine The Federalist in light of contextual sources such as classic republican political
theorists and Enlightenment philosophy. See McGowan, supra note 58, at 755-57 (distinguishing
between different theoretical bases for citing The Federalist, including a theory based on original
public meaning, one based on contract reliance, and one based more broadly on the essays as a po-
tential source of wisdom).
84. See McGowan, supra note 58; Lynch, supra note 80; Eskridge, supra note 76; Nourse,
supra note 80.
85. See generally, WILLS, supra note 58.
86. Kramer, Madison's Audience, supra note 13.
87. DAN COENEN, THE STORY OF "THE FEDERALIST": How HAMILTON AND MADISON
RECONCEIVED AMERICA (2007).
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creases that short list). Buckner F. Melton, Jr. has assembled an exten-
sive compilation of data on Supreme Court citations to The Federalist
through 2006.88 Melton's compilation provides lists of every Supreme
Court case citing The Federalist organized by case name, subject, and
Federalist number, along with statistical summaries for frequency of ci-
tations, citations per Justice, by author, and type of opinion.8 9
Ira C. Lupu, in a symposium response to Professor Eskridge's nor-
mative critique, researched the patterns of citation to The Federalist over
time, and documented the trend in frequency by decade. 90 Professor
Lupu determined that there was an extremely low frequency of citations
to The Federalist from the beginning of the Court through the early
twentieth century, and then a rapid increase-a series of doublings ap-
proximately every twenty to thirty years, leading to the current situation
of relatively rampant use of The Federalist by the Justices during the
Rehnquist Court years. 9' In the first decade of the twentieth century, for
example, there were only three citations to The Federalist, but by the
1980s there were fifty-six. 92 This exponential increase in citations over
the decades of the twentieth century has occurred alongside a decline in
the absolute number of cases the Court decides annually, meaning that as
a percentage of total cases, those which cite The Federalist comprise an
even larger proportion of the Court's work.93 Lupu followed up this re-
search with a separate article listing and commenting upon the essays
cited most often by the Court.9 4
Melvyn Durchslag's recent study likewise notes that Supreme
Court citations to The Federalist have increased in number in recent
years, especially in prominent examples such as the Printz case.95 Pro-
fessor Durchslag indicates, however, that the uptick in citations may
88. Buckner F. Melton, Jr. & Carol Wilcox Melton, The Supreme Court and The Federalist: A
Supplement, 2001-2006, 95 Ky. L.J. 749 (2007); Buckner F. Melton, Jr. & Jennifer J. Miller, The
Supreme Court and The Federalist: An Update, 1997-2001, 90 KY. L.J. 415 (2002); Melton, supra
note 14.
89. Melton, Jr. & Melton, The Supreme Court and The Federalist: A Supplement, 2001-2006,
supra note 88.
90. Lupu, supra note 14.
91. Id. at 1328-30. According to Lupu's research, the early decades of the republic saw only a
handful of citations to The Federalist; beginning in the 1930s the frequency of citations roughly
doubled each generation; in the 1980s there were fifty-six such cases, and from 1990-98 there were
sixty. Id. at 1328 tbl. Lupu notes: "More than half of all the Supreme Court decisions in which one
or more citations to The Federalist appear have been rendered since 1970." Id at 1328-1330.
92. Id. at 1328.
93. Id. at n.22; see also Kenneth W. Starr, The Legacy of Chief Justice Taft and the Court's
Shrinking Docket, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (2006).
94. Ira C. Lupu, The Most-Cited Federalist Papers, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 403, 404-10 (1998).
95. Durschlag, supra note 1, at 246-47.
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mean "less than meets the eye."96 His research concentrates not only on
the number of citations, but on an analysis of their "importance" to the
authoring Justice's opinion and to the eventual outcome of the case.97
Professor Durchslag concludes that despite the number of citations to
The Federalist, their overall influence on the Court's decisions has been
insignificant.98 I would argue that regardless of its centrality to an opin-
ion, the mere fact of a citation itself is important as a significant indicator
of a Justice's attempt to support her opinion with the persuasive, legiti-
mizing effect of historical evidence from the founding era-or as Dur-
chslag himself acknowledges, "[i]t is an appeal to a higher and more re-
vered authority." 99
While these studies are extremely illuminating on many questions
about the Supreme Court's use of The Federalist, none of them measure
or even address the phenomenon of cases in which different Justices who
disagree on the decision nevertheless each cite to The Federalist in their
respective opinions. In fact, Lupu explicitly notes that his methodology
treats a decision with multiple citations in different opinions to The Fed-
eralist as a single case for the purposes of his research. 00 Melton, while
noting the existence of cases where more than one opinion cites The
Federalist, makes no distinction between majority opinions, concur-
rences, and dissents.' My inquiry is based precisely on that question,
because I seek to explore the empirical implications of the arguments
that (1) The Federalist is a source favored primarily by conservatives or
by those who advocate an originalist jurisprudence; or (2) that The Fed-
eralist is indeterminate as a form of historical evidence.
If the words of Publius can be marshaled by either side, or in sup-
port of virtually any argument on any constitutional question, how often
does a citation to The Federalist appear in both a majority opinion (or
concurrence in the judgment) and a dissenting (or concurring) opinion?
96.Id. at 312.
97. Id at 248.
98. Id
99. Id. at 315 (citing SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 1 1 (1998)).
100. Lupu, supra note 94, at 404. One group of political scientists has looked into the circum-
stance of multiple opinions citing The Federalist in the same case. See Corley et al., supra note 11,
at 335. Corley et al. examine cases from 1953 to 1995 and measure, among other things, the fre-
quency of "dueling citations." They find that during those years the presence of multiple opinions
citing The Federalist in the same case is a result of attitudinal or strategic behavior: the separate
opinion utilizes The Federalist to respond to the majority opinion. Id. at 336-37. Although this
study looks at the range of Terms in the Rehnquist Court era, and focuses more on the implications
for arguments about originalism, ideology, and the use of historical analysis in law, the Corley
study's findings are consistent with those of this Article.
101. Melton, The Supreme Court and The Federalist: A Citation List and Analysis, 1789-1996,
supra note 14, at 254-56.
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Given the anecdotal evidence that Justices across the ideological spec-
trum will cite The Federalist, and that as an evidentiary source it can
provide support to competing opinions, accounting for the findings of the
previous research, I hypothesize that the results will show that in the de-
cisions of the Rehnquist Court from 1986-2005 (1) both liberal and con-
servative Justices cite to The Federalist, and (2) the opinions with cita-
tions to The Federalist will often be accompanied by multiple, conflict-
ing opinions that also cite The Federalist with significant frequency.
These results will be helpful in explaining the true influence of original-
ism on the Rehnquist Court, and in helping us understand the Court's
approach toward historical evidence as it proceeds under Chief Justice
Roberts.
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
The purpose of this research is to provide an empirical basis for un-
derstanding how the Supreme Court can use similar historical evidence
to support different sides of the same issue. This Article asks the ques-
tion: how often does the Court use similar historical evidence in both
majority and dissenting opinions within the same decision? Prior re-
search identifies The Federalist as perhaps the single historical source
most commonly cited by Supreme Court Justices. 10 2 Based on the nor-
mative and methodological issues discussed in the preceding sections, I
hypothesize that we can expect to find a positive, covariational relation-
ship between the number of Rehnquist Court decisions citing to The
Federalist and the number of decisions where more than one opinion,
including a dissent or a concurrence, cites The Federalist.
To conduct this inquiry, I proceed on several assumptions. First, I
assume that a citation to The Federalist indicates an attempt on the part
of a Justice to appeal to historical evidence in support of her opinion.
Some Justices may do so for more explicitly "originalist" purposes, such
as invoking as interpretive authority the original intent of framers Madi-
son, Hamilton, and Jay, or the original meaning of the words used in the
Constitution in 1787-89.103 Others may cite the papers for more of a
general allusion to American political theory or tradition. 10 4 Either way,
102. See Corley et al., supra note 11, at 330.
103. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 911-15 (discussion in Justice Scalia's majority opinion ana-
lyzing various essays from The Federalist as evidence of the authors' (particularly Hamilton's)
constitutional understandings); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep't of Environmental Quality, 511
U.S. 93, 98 (1994) (citation to Federalist No. 42 to interpret the meaning of the Commerce Clause,
in Justice Thomas's majority opinion).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 238-39 (2005) (citing Federalist No. 38
in Justice Stevens's opinion of the court as evidence of the Framers' understanding of "the ideals our
constitutional tradition assimilated from the common law").
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I believe that a citation to The Federalist represents a deliberate decision
to offer some form of historical support for the Justice's opinion, and
therefore to seek the legitimizing effect of historical authority.' °5 Sec-
ond, I assume that an opinion with any citation to The Federalist indi-
cates an attempt to use historical evidence as support no matter how
many or few citations there are within that opinion. My study will treat
all opinions citing The Federalist the same, regardless of how many
times a Justice invokes Publius.10 6 Third, I assume that the decisions of
the Rehnquist Court represent a sample population with analytical rele-
vance. I confine the study to the Rehnquist Court in part because it has
often been closely identified with originalism.'17 While the Roberts
Court may or may not prove to continue these trends (and I have in-
cluded a limited amount of data from its first two Terms for purposes of
comparison), the recent completion of the two-decade tenure of the late
Chief Justice Rehnquist provides a relatively complete sample of Terms
for analysis.
Fourth, I assume that based on the observations discussed above, all
Justices regardless of interpretive theory or political persuasion will cite
The Federalist to some extent. 10 8 That is, both the conservatives and the
liberals on the Court will cite to The Federalist with some frequency. It
is in this assumption that I counter the prevailing wisdom associating the
use of historical evidence as a tactic primarily of conservative original-
ists. Fifth, I treat dissents and concurrences equally as "disagreeing"
105. But see Durschlag, supra note 1 (arguing that many of the Justices' citations to The Fed-
eralist are not central to the reasoning of the Justices' opinions). While I accept Professor
Durschlag's characterizations of the citations, 1 respectfully disagree with the conclusion that this
somehow renders the citations unimportant. Regardless of the centrality of any citation to the rea-
soning of a given Justice's opinion, I contend that as a historical source clearly and closely identified
with the founding era as a "rhetoric for ratification" (see Coenen, supra note 21), any citation to The
Federalist stands for an attempt, however modest, to cloak the Justice's opinion with the aura of
historical legitimacy.
106. Professor Lupu, to the contrary, explicitly considered any decision with one or more
citations to The Federalist to be the same for the purposes of his study, even a case with as many
citations as Printz. Lupu, supra note 14, at 1328 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 598
(1997).
107. See LEVY, supra note 40, at 377-80; Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Crimi-
nal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (2006); Robert Post & Reva
Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living Constitutionalism, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 545, 545 (2006) ("To whatever extent the Rehnquist Court actually executed a counterrevolu-
tion, surely a good deal of its inspiration came from 'originalism."').
108. In fact, all nine of the Justices serving together for the last decade of the Rehnquist Court
have authored opinions citing to The Federalist within the scope of this study. See infra Table 2.
Interestingly, the only two current Justices who have not cited to The Federalist are the two newest,
and conservative, members of the Court: Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. See also Melton &
Melton, supra note 88, at 749-50 nn.6-7 (noting that neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Alito
has ever cited The Federalist during their respective judicial careers on both the Circuit Courts of
Appeal and the Supreme Court).
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opinions because while concurrences agree with at least part of the
judgment of the Court, the concurring Justice is presumably writing the
separate opinion (and citing The Federalist) because he or she disagrees
with some portion of the majority's holding or at least part of the major-
ity's rationale. Finally, because my intent is to explore situations where
the author of a separate opinion disagrees with the judgment of the
Court, I consider majority opinions, opinions of the Court, and per cu-
riam opinions to be categorically the same for these purposes.
I will use a quasi-experimental design with two variables, using a
time series analysis of Rehnquist Court decisions by year from 1986-
2005. The independent variable is the absolute number of decisions per
year with any citation to The Federalist. This is essentially the same data
that Lupu compiled in his 1998 study,0 9 but it will expand the results
through 2005. The dependent variable is the number of decisions per
year that have multiple opinions citing The Federalist, including dissent-
ing opinions. To refine the hypothesis, I predict a positive, covariational
relationship between the independent and dependent variables: the
greater the frequency of decisions citing The Federalist, the greater will
be the frequency of decisions with multiple, and dissenting, opinions cit-
ing The Federalist.
To translate these variables into measurable indicators, I conducted
the research in the Westlaw database. For both variables, I confined the
searches to decisions between September 26, 1986 (the date William
Rehnquist was sworn in as Chief Justice) and September 3, 2005 (the
date of the Chief Justice's death). To measure the independent variable,
I searched for all decisions that contain any citation to The Federalist."o
I used search terms equivalent to those used by Lupu, in order to main-
tain the comparability of our findings.11' To measure the dependent vari-
able, I searched for all opinions citing The Federalist, adding a term que-
rying for cases that include a dissenting or concurring opinion. 112 This
produced a list of cases that cite to The Federalist and also include a dis-
109. Lupu, supra note 14, at 1328.
110. To find all cases citing The Federalist the research utilized the search term (PUBLIUS)
(FEDERALIST W/10 NO. NUMBER NOS. PAPER!) (FEDERALIST W/P MADISON JAY
HAMILTON) & DA (AFT SEPTEMBER 26 1986).
111. Lupu conducted his research in the LEXIS database, so my Westlaw research modified
his terms slightly, in order to measure the same results given the differences in search terms between
the two databases. See Lupu, supra note 14, at 1327 n.19 (listing his LEXIS search terms).
112. To account for separate opinions, the research utilized the search term (PUBLIUS)
(FEDERALIST W/10 NO. NUMBER NOS. PAPER!) (FEDERALIST W/P MADISON JAY
HAMILTON)
& (DISSENTING CONCURRING) & DA (AFT SEPTEMBER 26, 1986).
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senting or concurring opinion,' 3 not necessarily those where both a ma-
jority and a dissenting opinion make a measurable citation. I then
screened the results case by case, excluding decisions that included a
dissent or concurrence but did not include multiple, disagreeing opinions
each citing The Federalist. The remaining list only includes cases that
indicate the dependent variable.
The results are presented in tabular form, listing for each year of the
Rehnquist Court how many decisions meet the requirements of the inde-
pendent variable and how many meet the requirements of the dependent
variable. The data listed to indicate the independent variable is the direct
number of cases produced by the Westlaw query. The dependent vari-
able will be measured by the list of results I obtained after screening the
database query. To the extent that any trends can be induced from the
results, they are summarized as appropriate. The presentation of the re-
sults as a time series should allow for predictions of frequency to The
Federalist in the immediate future (taking into account the change in
Court personnel). This is an important issue given the questions about
the Court's future direction that have arisen since Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito have joined the Court.1 14
This research design does not provide a perfect measure of the
Court's use of history in competing arguments, but I believe that it is
both feasible and appropriate in providing an illustration of one promi-
nent way that the Court uses historical evidence. While I do not neces-
sarily assert a causal relationship between the variables, the existence of
a covariational relationship at minimum will confirm the internal validity
of the design, and will suggest that a majority opinion with many refer-
ences to The Federalist might be a factor encouraging separate authors
also to cite The Federalist. The design is externally valid, with a caveat:
it can not be generalized to the extent that it does not account for either
the quality or degree of reliance on The Federalist in any particular case,
or for a Justice's reliance on historical sources other than The Federalist.
These questions can be measured with additional research beyond the
scope of this Article. Finally, the operational design of the indicators is
reliable; searches in the comprehensive Westlaw database can be repli-
cated with ease.
113. In fact, it does not even necessarily limit the results to these cases, because given the
query, it could potentially include cases simply using the words "federalist" and "dissenting" in the
text. However, the subsequent screening process eliminates these potential cases, along with the
more common decisions that cite The Federalist and include a dissenting opinion, but where either
the majority/concurring opinions or the dissent do not cite The Federalist.
114. See Simon Lazarus, Federalism R.I.P.? Did the Roberts Hearings Junk the Rehnquist
Court's Federalism Revolution?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2006).
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V. RESULTS: THE FEDERALIST IS FREQUENTLY
CITED BY MULTIPLE JUSTICES IN THE SAME CASES
The results from the primary research question are listed below in
Table 1. I will first discuss the frequency with which the opinions con-
tained at least one citation to The Federalist. There were 112 total
Rehnquist Court decisions that contained a citation to The Federalist in
one or more opinion." 5 This means that over the nineteen-year span of
the Rehnquist Court, approximately 5.9 decisions per year cited The
Federalist. Given the average number of about 70 cases per year that the
Court has decided in recent years," 16 this means that nearly 9% contained
a Federalist cite. This is a significant portion of the Court's total docket.
Next, I turn to the results for the dependent variable. The total
number of cases with multiple opinions citing The Federalist, extended
over the duration of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence, is 21 cases in
19 years, an average of just over one per year.11 7 In no single year were
there more than three such cases. There were no such cases during the
period 1992-94. While the absolute number of these cases per year may
not seem great when considered as a total and as a percentage of all cases
that cite The Federalist, the numbers are much more significant than ap-
pears at first glance. Out of 112 total cases citing The Federalist, 21 con-
tained a separate opinion (dissent or concurrence) disagreeing with some
portion of the majority's holding or reasoning that also cited The Feder-
alist to support its contradictory argument. 1 8 There is a much higher
incidence, therefore, of cases with multiple opinions citing The Federal-
ist when considered as a proportion of the cases that cite The Federalist
at least once.
This means that out of all the decisions in which the Justice writing
for the majority invokes The Federalist as historical evidence, over 18%
115. Infra, Table 1.
116. See Starr, supra note 93, at 1368-69.
117. The complete list of cases in the dependent variable--cases where there were disagreeing
opinions that cited The Federalist-is as follows: Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S.
452 (2002); United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Clinton v. City
of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boeme v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Gutierrez de Martinez
v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (1995); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995);
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abate-
ment of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991); United States v. Verdago-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways and Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
118. Infra Table 1.
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(or nearly one in five) have a dissent or a concurrence that also cites The
Federalist. As explained further below, this result supports the claims
that (1) historical arguments (exemplified by reliance on The Federalist)
are in fact used on both sides by Justices who disagree with each other on
the outcomes or rationales in cases; and (2) as a source of historical evi-
dence, The Federalist can be used to support such competing and contra-
dictory arguments.
Year Cases with at Cases with Percentage
Least One Multiple
Citation to Opinions
The Federal- with Cites
ist to The Fed-
eralist
1986 1 1 100
1987 6 1 16.6
1988 3 1 33
1989 7 2 28.6
1990 12 1 8.3
1991 9 1 11.1
1992 6 0 0
1993 2 0 0
1994 6 0 0
1995 11 3 27.3
1996 3 1 33
1997 11 2 18.2
1998 2 1 50
1999 5 2 40
2000 8 0 0
2001 4 1 25
2002 6 1 16.6
2003 2 0 0
2004 2 1 50
2005 6 2 33
TOTAL 112 21 18.75
Table 1. Rehnquist Court Decisions with
Opinions Citing The Federalist (1986-2005)
31:75
Multiple
The cases meeting the criteria for the dependent variable thus make
up 18.75% of the number of cases in the independent variable. When the
Dueling Federalists
independent variable is considered in light of Lupu's findings that cita-
tions to The Federalist increased significantly in the 1980s and 1990s
relative to previous decades, 1 9 it is even more reasonable to infer that the
incidence of Supreme Court decisions where multiple, disagreeing opin-
ions each cite The Federalist currently occur more frequently than they
have in the past. If we accept the conventional wisdom (supported by
Lupu's empirical findings) that the Supreme Court (and especially the
Rehnquist Court) has relied increasingly on The Federalist as a source of
support for its opinions, then it is clear that a substantial percentage of
those opinions are now accompanied by a dissent or concurrence that
also cites the same historical source: The Federalist. This data supports
the conclusion that the appeal of historical authority to the Justices is
significant enough that in a substantial percentage of cases where one
Justice cites The Federalist as historical authority, another Justice will
invoke the same historical source to support a different outcome or a dif-
ferent rationale.
Moreover, the frequency of multiple citations to The Federalist is
not linked to any one ideological persuasion, liberal or conservative,
among the Justices. The results do not indicate any significant trends
that can be attributed to the presence or departure of any particular Jus-
tice or Justices. To confirm this, I examined the frequency of citations to
The Federalist by all Justices serving during or after the Rehnquist Court
years, as shown in Table 2.120 During the years of the Rehnquist Court
from 1986-2005, seven Justices were replaced, but there were about as
many decisions citing The Federalist in multiple opinions during the last
few years of the Rehnquist Court as there were at the beginning. 121 It is
thus unlikely that a change in Court personnel acts as an antecedent vari-
able. Furthermore, through the 21 cases within the dependent variable,
all nine of the Rehnquist Court Justices with two or more full terms
completed have cited The Federalist at least once. 122 On the new Rob-
erts Court, neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Alito has yet cited
119. These results do not show any significant increase or decline (accounting for a few outly-
ing peak or trough years in a linear model) in the number of cases citing The Federalist in the decade
since Lupu's study. Lupu, supra note 14, at 1328.
120. Infra Table 2.
121. Notably, the single year in which the Court issued the most decisions citing to The Feder-
alist (1990, with twelve decisions) was the year before Justice Thomas joined the Court, even though
he is often regarded as one of the Court's most avid consumers of historical evidence of original
intent. Supra Table 1.
122. Infra Table 2.
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The Federalist, but it is too early to tell whether or not they will contrib-
ute to the long-term trend of the modem Court towards increasing fre-
quency of citations to The Federalist in particular or to historical evi-
dence in general. 23
123. Some commentary has discussed whether the early jurisprudence of Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito is conservative but "minimalist," or is seeking to adhere as closely to precedent as
possible while reaching their desired results. See Jonathan H. Adler, How Conservative is this
Court?, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, July 5, 2007,
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=Y2Y3NjNkM2ZkYTcxNzQwYTBhZWZkNzEyZGYyMWEx
MjE=; Posting of Cass Sunstein to the Faculty Blog,
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/05/chief justice r.html (May 25, 2006 09:52 CST).
This approach would seem to eschew (as their opinions have) reliance on historical sources to inter-
pret the Constitution's meaning. Only time will tell whether the Roberts Court proves as fond of
history as has the Rehnquist Court. However, as Coenen points out, even during the two Justices'
Senate confirmation hearings, The Federalist was mentioned at least eleven times, indicating that
even in the popular imagination the work of the Supreme Court has something to do with ideas ex-
plicated in The Federalist. See Coenen, supra note 21, at 471-72 (citing transcripts from the Rob-
erts and Alito confirmation hearings).
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Table 2. Citations to The Federalist by Justice, Sept. 1986-2007
Justice First Year Last Year # of Terms Opinions Average
*Conservative(C) on the on the on the Citing to Citations
*Liberal (L) Court' Court' Court' The Feder- per Term'
alist1
Alito (C) 2006 2007 1.5 0 0.0
Kennedy(C) 1988 2007 19.5 10 0.5
O'Connor (C) 1986 2005 18.5 15 0.8
Powell (C) 1986 1987 1 2 2.0
Rehnquist (C) 1986 2005 19 17 0.9
Roberts (C) 2005 2007 2 0 0.0
Scalia (C) 1986 2007 21 16 0.8
Thomas (C) 1991 2007 17 5 0.3
White (C) 1986 1993 7 3 0.4
SUB-TOTAL(C) 106.5 68 0.6
Blackmun (L) 1986 1994 8 1 0.1
Brennan (L) 1986 1990 4 5 1.3
Breyer (L) 1994 2007 13 6 0.5
Ginsburg (L) 1993 2005 12 2 0.2
Souter (L) 1990 2007 17 11 0.6
Stevens (L) 1986 2007 21 20 1.0
SUB-TOTAL (L) 1..75 45 1 0.6
Note 1: Includes only Court Terms from 1986 through 2007
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One of the hypotheses presented above is that despite the common
presumption that the use of history is more common among judicial con-
servatives, the phenomenon of dueling citations shows that even Justices
who disagree on outcomes, whether conservative or liberal, will often
advert to the same historical source. The results in Table 2 further con-
firm that neither ideological wing of the Court monopolizes citations to
The Federalist. In the first column of Table 2, I have listed the Justices
by alphabetical order and ideology. (I have included Justices Roberts and
Alito for the sake of comparison to the Justices of the Rehnquist Court,
and extended the analysis through 2007 in order to determine whether
there are any discernable trends or predictors based on the addition of
these two new Justices.)
Next to each Justice's name, I entered a coded identifier of (L) for
the Justices typically considered to be liberals and (C) for the Justices
typically considered to be conservatives. Although Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Powell have been considered to function as moderate or"swing" Justices, I placed them in the conservative group. 24 Of the six
Justices with ten or more Federalist citations, two (Stevens and Souter)
are liberals, and four are conservatives (Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor,
and Kennedy). The relative frequency with which Stevens, Souter, and
the other liberal Justices invoke Publius indicates that The Federalist is
not merely the favored historical source of a group of hidebound
originalists. Indeed, even the citations by the "swing" voters O'Connor
and Kennedy indicate that allusion to historical sources such as The Fed-
eralist is not limited to strict originalists but rather can be appealing to
Justices in the middle as well.
Furthermore, when the numbers are divided to show the ratio of
Federalist citations to the number of each Justice's terms on the Court
since 1986, the clear leader is the liberal lion Justice Brennan, followed
closely by Justice Stevens, with just less than one citation per term. 125
Stevens is followed in order by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia, Justice Souter, and Justice Kennedy. 126 The Federalist has been
most often cited as historical evidence by a liberal Justice, followed by
124. See Eric Claeys, Takings: An Appreciative Retrospective, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
439 (2006). While Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have often been referred to as "swing" voters or
"moderate" Justices, over their whole careers on the Court they have come down more often in the
conservative bloc rather than the liberal bloc. Id. at 442. While this methodology has its limitations
in accounting for nuances and shades of judicial ideology, my decision to place the moderates ap-
pointed by Republican presidents in the "conservative" category reduces confusion and has the ad-
vantage for the purposes of this inquiry of separating out the Justices who are almost universally
regarded as the "liberal" bloc for comparison of citations.
125. Supra Table 2.
126. Supra Table 2.
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two conservatives, a liberal, and a "swing" conservative. This result un-
dermines any notion that The Federalist is used primarily by conserva-
tive Justices to buttress an originalist approach toward interpreting the
Constitution. To be sure, it is entirely possible that liberal and conserva-
tive Justices cite The Federalist for different ideological or tactical rea-
sons. But the results generally support the hypothesis of this Article that
just as history is today being used by legal scholars to support legal ar-
guments from a wide political and ideological spectrum, historical evi-
dence (as exemplified by citations to The Federalist) is also being used
by Supreme Court Justices from divergent ideological perspectives in
constitutional decision-making.
VI. DISCUSSION: THE USE OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE IN OPPOSING
LEGAL ARGUMENTS
This Article's hypothesis predicted that just as legal scholars have
used history to support divergent legal arguments, judges (in particular,
Supreme Court Justices) will also use historical evidence to support con-
flicting opinions in some cases. 12 7 The research question investigated
whether a positive relationship can be shown between the overall number
of cases citing The Federalist, and the number of cases where multiple,
disagreeing opinions each cite The Federalist. In light of the results, it is
clear that this relationship exists. The percentage of cases with at least
one citation to The Federalist that also have disagreeing opinions citing
The Federalist during the tenure of the Rehnquist Court is a significant
18.75%. This means that nearly one in five cases that invoke The Feder-
alist essays of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay will include a separate opin-
ion offering a different version of history.
These results are also valuable because they shed light on the nor-
mative and methodological questions asked at the outset. When viewed
in terms of the frequency of cases in the dependent variable relative to
cases in the independent variable, the results indeed show that first, his-
torical argument is the province of no one ideological wing of the Court,
and second, that Justices who advocate divergent holdings or rationales
in constitutional decisions are often willing to offer competing historical
arguments using the same evidence. Accepting Lupu's research indicat-
ing that the more recent volumes of the United States Reports are "posi-
tively riotous" with citations to The Federalist,'28 the fact that nearly one
in five of these cases contain multiple, disagreeing opinions citing The
127. See supra Part II.
128. Lupu, supra note 14, at 1330.
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Federalist indicates that the use of historical sources to support compet-
ing interpretations is indeed a noteworthy phenomenon.
Several alternative hypotheses may help fill in the blanks and indi-
cate where future research with a greater scope may be able to more
thoroughly examine the relationship between the Supreme Court and the
indeterminacy of historical evidence. As noted above, we do not always
know exactly why a Justice chooses to cite The Federalist, whether it is
truly out of respect for historical authority, or from more of an attitudinal
or strategic purpose. Furthermore, The Federalist, while possibly the
most cited, is not the only historical source the Justices employ. Justices,
as well as litigants, scholars, and politicians, often refer to the Declara-
tion of Independence, the notes from the Constitutional Convention,
early judicial decisions, acts of Congress, and learned commentaries such
as those of Blackstone and Story. 129 Further research will be able to take
into account a wider variety of examples of the use of history on the
Court, perhaps comparing the relative uses of different sources in a mul-
tivariate analysis. However, this Article is a starting point for research-
ers interested in measuring how the Court uses history, and in particular
how such use can often transcend any particular judicial ideology.
Additionally, the nature of the relationship between majority opin-
ions on the one hand, and dissents and concurrences on the other, may
have led Justices to minimize citations to The Federalist below the re-
ported levels. It is possible that in the dynamics of speaking "for the
Court," a Justice feels less need to bolster his opinion with historical evi-
dence and is more likely to try and portray the holding as consistent with
precedent. In screening the initial results of the search on the dependent
variable, there were a number of cases where the dissent or concurrence,
but not the majority, cited The Federalist. Even given these possibilities,
however, the results do demonstrate that at certain times Court members
of opposing judicial ideologies and opinions in a particular case will cite
the same source of historical evidence when it can be used to fortify even
opposing conclusions regarding the outcome of a given case.
I offer two observations that also present questions for further
study. First, a review of the twenty-one Rehnquist Court decisions with
129. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing "the principle of equality embodied in the Declaration of Independ-
ence"); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 717 (2003) (Souter, J.) (citing the RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 25 (M. Farrand ed.1911)); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
538-39 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (citing the Northwest Ordinance of 1787); Marshall v.
Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006) (Ginsburg, J.) (discussing the 1789 Judiciary Act); Morse v. Freder-
ick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2631 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Blackstone's Commentaries);
McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 880 (2005) (O'Connor, J.) (citing
Justice Story's Commentaries).
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competing interpretations of The Federalist reveals that they are almost
all high-profile cases dealing with fundamental questions of constitu-
tional structure such as federalism and separation of powers. In fact, the
list reads like the contents of a modem constitutional law casebook. Dur-
ing the 1990s, when federalism issues were prominent, the Justices of-
fered dueling versions of The Federalist in the landmark decisions of
Alden v. Maine, Clinton v. New York, Printz v. United States, City of
Boerne v. Flores, and Seminole Tribe, among others. In the last few
years this has continued in well-known constitutional cases such as the
medical marijuana decision in Gonzales v. Raich and the death penalty
case Roper v. Simmons. Others, such as the 2004 decision in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, have also tracked the shift from federalism concerns towards
separation of powers questions in the high-profile cases that have been
presented to the Court in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks and the War on Terror.' 30 This trend may continue in the near
future if additional cases involving the Guantanamo detainees work their
way to the Supreme Court.
Printz in particular offers a veritable battle royale of competing
Federalist-based arguments, where Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Souter
disagree vehemently over how the essays illuminate the constitutional
question before the Court. They collectively cite The Federalist a whop-
ping fifty-eight times in the decision. Indeed, over the course of the
opinion Justice Scalia cited The Federalist thirty times; Justice Stevens
ten times, and Justice Souter eighteen times.' 31 Souter's short dissent
testifies to the power and the attractiveness of The Federalist as an inter-
pretive guide to historical meaning: "In deciding these cases," he wrote,
"it is The Federalist that finally determines my position."'132 Perhaps a
Court battle over history is more likely to occur in such fundamental
constitutional cases, where the stakes are high and the issue goes to the
heart of the Constitution's meaning.
VII. CONCLUSION
Finally, this study demonstrates the existence of a remarkable
event: the members of the Court deploying history against one another.
While it may not have cut the Gordian knot that has entangled the Court
and Clio, 133 this Article's examination of the uses of The Federalist has
130. 542 U.S. 507 (2004); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2780, 2822-23,
2830 (2006) (citing Federalist Nos. 28, 47, and 70 in discussing original understanding of separation
of powers and the constitutional powers over military functions).
131. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
132. Id. at 971 (Souter, J., dissenting).
133. See Richards, supra note 44.
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highlighted some of the normative and empirical questions that must be
pursued when considering how practitioners of the law employ the
sources of history. It underscores the notion that, regardless of the nor-
mative arguments for or against the use of history in legal interpretation,
history is widely used by courts as well as by scholars and the public in
understanding American law. Perhaps the more important task before us
is to focus on the more practical, methodological questions of how we
can assure that when historical sources and methods are used in the law,
they are used appropriately. Most of all, we should recognize that no
single political or ideological persuasion can be said to have a monopoly
on the use of history in law.
